Joris DeeneAnyone who falls victim to an unauthorized payment transaction wants their money back quickly and, to that end, points to the bank’s legal obligation to provide immediate reimbursement. But does that legal requirement for immediate reimbursement also open the door to summary proceedings? Within two weeks, two presidents of commercial courts gave conflicting rulings: on May 26, 2026, the president of the Antwerp Commercial Court ordered a refund of nearly 50,000 EUR, while the presiding judge of the Dutch-speaking Commercial Court in Brussels, on June 10, 2026, declared a claim for repayment of 238,281.38 EUR unfounded due to a lack of urgency. Below, you can read about where the dividing line lies.
The facts
The case involved a company. On January 8, 2026, EUR 294,900 was debited from its checking account through what it described as unauthorized payment transactions. After a partial refund, EUR 238,281.38 remained outstanding. The company filed a summons against its bank on March 26, 2026, in summary proceedings and, pending a final determination of liability, sought the restoration of its account pursuant to Art. VII.43 Code of Economic Law (CEL). The bank disputed the urgency of the matter.
The documents showed that on January 21, 2026, the bank had granted the company an overdraft facility of 300,000 EUR, valid through the end of 2026. The company chose this option rather than freeing up its own funds, even though, according to its own balance sheet, its cash investments amounted to 3,722,780.99 EUR and its cash and cash equivalents totaled 236,260.64 EUR.
The decision
The presiding judge notes that urgency is both a jurisdictional and a substantive requirement for summary proceedings. As a jurisdictional requirement, it is sufficient for the plaintiff to assert it in the summons; as a substantive requirement, it is a question of fact that is assessed on a case-by-case basis.
The company argued that the urgency stems from the law itself, namely from the immediate repayment obligation under Article VII.43, § 1 of the WER. The presiding judge rejects this argument. The fact that this provision imposes a provisional and immediate repayment obligation on the bank does not mean that Article 584 Code of Civil Procedure (Ger.W.) Urgency is presumed by law. Where the legislature intended to establish a presumption of urgency, it did so explicitly; this was not the case for this claim for reimbursement.
The decisive factor is that the plaintiff could also have sought the same preliminary injunction in the trial court pursuant to Article 19, paragraph 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure, if necessary, in summary proceedings pursuant to Article 735, § 2 of the Judicial Code. If the plaintiff can obtain the requested measure just as effectively before the trial court, there is no urgency. The company had not even argued that this avenue was not available to it. Moreover, given its ample liquid assets and its decision to take out an overdraft facility, its financial distress was not so urgent that it had to resort to summary proceedings. The claim was declared admissible but unfounded.
Legal analysis and interpretation
Two chairpersons, two conflicting interpretations of the same obligation to repay immediately
The crux of the dispute lies in whether the statutory obligation to make immediate repayment under Art. VII.43 of the WER extends to the procedural urgency requirement under Art. 584 of the Ger.W. The Brussels presiding judge keeps the two strictly separate: immediate repayment is a substantive legal characteristic of the obligation, while urgency is a separate condition for admissibility that the court assesses on a case-by-case basis. This approach is consistent with the classical doctrine that urgency relates not to admissibility but to the merits of the case, so that an action in summary proceedings may be perfectly admissible yet still be unfounded due to a lack of urgency.
On May 26, 2026, the presiding judge of the Antwerp Commercial Court did exactly the opposite. In a case in which an elderly couple, aged 90 and 93, saw 49,958 EUR disappear to Portugal following a phishing call, he ordered reimbursement, plus interest for delay from the date of the fraud, and held the bank liable for costs. That presiding judge derived the urgency directly from the nature of the statutory deadline: since the legislature mandates reimbursement immediately and no later than the end of the next business day, non-compliance is, by its very nature, urgent; the plaintiffs’ age and financial dependence were merely superfluous considerations. This is a construction that is not self-evident in legal doctrine, as it renders urgency—normally a matter of sovereign factual assessment—almost automatically present in this type of case. We discussed this reasoning at length in our earlier article on the question of whether the bank, following a phishing attack, You must repay first, even in cases of gross negligence.
The result is a genuine divergence in case law. The outcome therefore seems to depend heavily on the court hearing the case and, in all likelihood, on the factual context.
The factual context as a key to reconciliation
The contrast may be less absolute than it seems. Both chairpersons state their principles in general terms, but the underlying facts differ fundamentally. In Antwerp, the case involved an elderly couple who suddenly saw a substantial amount of money disappear; in Brussels, it involved a company with several million in investments that could afford to lose the disputed sum without significant hardship and had, moreover, obtained a line of credit.
The urgency derived from the nature of the deadline is simply more compelling in the case of a vulnerable consumer for whom the lost amount is significant than in the case of a financially strong company that can easily wait for the reimbursement. It is therefore justifiable not to interpret the Brussels ruling as a rejection of the Antwerp approach, but rather as the application of that same urgency test to a case in which the actual urgency was simply lacking. The distinction between consumers and businesses—which is also relevant in the legal framework governing unauthorized payment transactions through the exception provided in Article VII.29 of the WER for non-consumers—thus also influences the procedural assessment.
The litigation risk associated with the chosen course of action
What the Brussels ruling illustrates above all is that the choice between summary proceedings and proceedings on the merits with provisional measures constitutes an independent litigation risk. The presiding judge does not address the fundamental question of whether the transactions were permissible. The claim fails entirely on a procedural preliminary issue. A claim that might have been substantively strong is lost, not because the plaintiff was wrong, but because the chosen course of action was not recognized as urgent under the specific circumstances of the case. The Antwerp ruling shows the flip side: there, summary proceedings are precisely a swift and effective means of pressure, supported by the opinion of Advocate General Rantos of March 5, 2026, in the pending case C-70/25 before the CJEU, which upholds the obligation for immediate reimbursement even in cases of suspected gross negligence.
Specifically, what does this mean?
For consumers who have been victims of bank fraud. The Antwerp line of argument offers a compelling case: the immediate repayment obligation under Article VII.43 of the WER can, in and of itself, justify the urgency of the preliminary relief proceedings, especially in the case of vulnerable payers for whom the amount is a significant burden. Support your case with a detailed factual account of the fraud and proof of timely reporting (fraud hotline, Card Stop, police report), and formally serve the bank with a notice of default before filing the summons.
For businesses and well-funded plaintiffs. The Brussels ruling serves as a warning. Anyone who has ample liquid assets or investments, or who opted for a credit solution instead of freeing up their own funds, will quickly see the urgency they cited undermined. In that case, consider seeking a preliminary injunction from the court on the merits pursuant to Article 19, paragraph 3, of the Judicial Code, if necessary through summary proceedings. If you do opt for summary proceedings, explain specifically in the summons why proceedings on the merits do not offer an equally effective alternative and what the actual urgency consists of.
For banks and payment service providers. The argument of gross negligence (and thus no reimbursement) loses its force in summary proceedings, but the urgency threshold remains a viable line of defense, especially against non-vulnerable plaintiffs. Anyone wishing to suspend the provisional reimbursement within the system itself can, in principle, do so only through the strict exception provided for in Article VII.43 of the WER: a reasonable suspicion of fraud on the part of the payer, reported in writing to the FPS Economy.
Frequently asked questions (FAQ)
Can I use summary proceedings to compel my bank to immediately refund money that was fraudulently transferred?
That depends on the court and your situation. Some judges infer the urgency directly from the statutory repayment period set forth in Article VII.43 of the WER, especially in cases involving vulnerable consumers. Others rule that this statutory immediacy does not in itself create urgency, especially if you can afford to lose the amount or can just as easily seek the same remedy in proceedings on the merits.
What is the difference between summary proceedings and a provisional measure under Article 19, paragraph 3, of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure?
Interim relief proceedings are a separate, extraordinary procedure that requires urgency. Article 19, paragraph 3, of the Judicial Code allows the trial court to order a provisional measure while the main action is pending, without the need to conduct a separate summary proceeding. If this approach yields an equally effective result, the need for summary proceedings may be eliminated.
Does it matter whether I'm acting as a consumer or as a business?
Yes, on two levels. Under substantive law, Article VII.29 of the WER permits contractual deviations from certain protective provisions in dealings with non-consumers. Under procedural law, the actual urgency of a case involving a vulnerable consumer often carries greater weight than in a case involving a financially strong company, which affects access to preliminary relief proceedings.
Conclusion
Two commercial courts, two conflicting answers to the same question: the bank’s obligation to repay immediately is a strong substantive law argument, but whether it automatically opens the door to summary proceedings remains disputed. The Antwerp presiding judge derives the urgency from the nature of the statutory deadline, while the Brussels judge strictly distinguishes between substantive law’s immediacy and procedural urgency. The difference between a vulnerable consumer and a financially strong company likely explains a large part of this divergence. Until a higher court provides clarity, anyone seeking reimbursement would be well advised to carefully choose the appropriate legal avenue and to substantiate the urgency with concrete evidence.
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