Joris DeeneAn opposition politician who reveals the impending privatization of a publicly traded state-owned company during a radio interview: does he thereby violate the prohibition on disclosing inside information? In its June 18, 2026, ruling, the Court of Justice (C-376/24) ruled that this is not necessarily the case. The disclosure of inside information in the media by a politician may fall within the normal exercise of his or her duties and be protected by freedom of the press, provided that it is necessary and proportionate. The case centers on former Belgian Minister Labille, who in 2016 announced the sale of part of the state’s stake in Bpost to PostNL.
The facts
Jean-Pascal Labille served as Minister of Public Enterprises in the federal government from January 2013 to October 2014. After the May 2014 elections, his party ended up in the opposition. In May 2016, the law of December 16, 2015, made the privatization of publicly traded state-owned enterprises such as Bpost legally possible, and on May 11, 2016, Bpost’s articles of incorporation were amended accordingly.
On May 27, 2016, Labille stated during an RTBF radio program that Bpost would lose its status as a state-owned enterprise very soon and that the state would sell a portion of its shares, adding that this was “really a matter of hours.” He added that negotiations were underway regarding the sale of 10 percent of the shares to the Dutch company PostNL. That same day, he confirmed and elaborated on that information in interviews with lavenir.net and Le Soir.
At that time, confidential negotiations were underway with PostNL, and a press release announcing the completion of the deal was scheduled for June 6, 2016. Following Labille’s statements, Bpost requested a suspension of trading in its shares; the negotiations stalled, and the merger did not go through. In a decision dated May 11, 2023, the FSMA’s Sanctions Committee imposed an administrative fine of 12,500 EUR on Labille for violating Article 25, § 1, 1°, b) of the Act of August 2, 2002. Labille filed an appeal with the Brussels Court of Appeal, which referred two questions for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice.
The decision
The Court reformulates both questions and addresses them together. The applicable law is, in principle, Article 3(a) of Directive 2003/6, which was in effect at the time of the events and is substantively consistent with Article 10, paragraph 1, of the Market Abuse Regulation. Whether the more favorable provision of Article 21 of that regulation applies retroactively (lex mitior, Article 49(1) of the Charter) depends on the interpretation of that article itself and is a matter for the examination on the merits.
The basic principle is that the exception to the prohibition—namely, disclosure “in the normal course of one’s work, profession, or duties”—must be interpreted restrictively. It requires a close connection between the disclosure and that normal exercise, and is justified only when the disclosure is strictly necessary and complies with the principle of proportionality.
Nevertheless, the Court does not rule out the possibility that disclosure by a politician falls within the scope of the normal exercise of that office. This is particularly the case when an active and influential member of an opposition party, independently of any parliamentary office, seeks to challenge government policy and defend the interests of a segment of the electorate by bringing their views into the public debate.
The Court then ruled that Article 21 of the Regulation may apply to a disclosure made by a politician. The words “other forms of expression in the media” refer, in a general sense, to the dissemination of information in the media and are not limited to journalists. Given the importance of freedom of the press and freedom of speech the terms “journalistic purposes” and “other forms of media expression” must be interpreted broadly.
However, the application of Article 21 is subject to two negative conditions: the person concerned or closely associated persons may not derive any benefit or profit, and the disclosure must not be intended to mislead the market. The Court clarifies that the benefit must, in principle, be of an economic nature; a purely political benefit does not count. The referring court found that Labille did not derive any benefit and did not intend to mislead the market.
The Court rules that Article 3(a) of Directive 2003/6, Article 10(1), and Article 21 of Regulation No. 596/2014, read in light of the Articles 11 and 52 of the Charter, Article 10 ECHR and the principle of equality must be interpreted as meaning that such disclosure may fall within the normal exercise of a politician’s duties, insofar as it is necessary and consistent with the principle of proportionality. It is for the referring court to assess this in concrete terms.
Legal analysis and interpretation
The Court builds on the Autorité des marchés financiers ruling, but shifts the boundary
The ruling is the logical extension of the Autorité des marchés financiers ruling, in which the Court ruled in 2022 that the disclosure of inside information for journalistic purposes is not unlawful when it is necessary and proportionate. While that ruling concerned a journalist, the current case involves a politician. The reasoning is similar: the requirement of a close connection takes on specific characteristics due to the nature of the disclosure and is influenced by the context of fundamental rights.
The core of the expansion lies in interpreting “other forms of expression in the media” as an objective, rather than subjective, criterion. What is protected is the dissemination of information in the media as such, regardless of whether it originates from a journalist or someone else. This objective interpretation is consistent with the broad interpretation the Court previously applied to the concept of journalistic activity in the context of data protection, as well as with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which recognizes that the platform for public debate is not limited to the mainstream press.
The economic interpretation of “benefit” is the cornerstone of the ruling
The most significant clarification concerns the first negative condition of Article 21. The Court limits the concept of “benefit or profit” to an economic benefit that positively affects the financial situation of the distributor or closely associated persons. A political benefit, such as the electoral gain from a successful opposition campaign, is expressly excluded.
That distinction is decisive. If political advantage were also taken into account, the exception would be virtually rendered meaningless, since virtually every political expression yields some indirect political gain. The Advocate General had already warned on this point that a different interpretation would significantly narrow the scope of the exception. The Court follows this line of reasoning and enshrines it in recital 23 of the regulation, which links the unfair advantage to market transactions.
The necessity test remains the weak point for the person concerned
The recognition in principle should not obscure the fact that the actual outcome remains uncertain. The Court explicitly provides the referring court with counterarguments: in Belgium, a debate on privatization had already taken place in connection with the law of December 16, 2015, and a press release announcing its completion was scheduled for June 6, 2016. The court must determine whether the disclosure, including specific details about the parties and the remaining state interest, was indeed the most appropriate means of informing the public.
This is where the problem lies. Labille’s message was, in fact, time-sensitive: the transaction could still be stopped. A general reopening of the debate would not have had the same effect as the revelation that the government was about to decide on privatization in the very near future. The Advocate General therefore considered the disclosure necessary. However, the Court leaves that assessment entirely to the Belgian court, which by no means guarantees a favorable outcome for the person concerned.
Specifically, what does this mean?
For politicians An opposition politician may invoke the exception under the Market Abuse Regulation when he shares price-sensitive information in the media to spark a debate in the public interest. The decisive factor is that he does not derive any economic benefit and does not intend to mislead the market. When making a sensitive disclosure, it is worth establishing in advance what public interest it serves and why the media is the most appropriate channel, because it is precisely on that point of necessity that the regulator will launch its counterattack.
For issuers and their directors. The ruling protects the speaker, not the company. A publicly traded company facing an external disclosure of an ongoing transaction retains its own remedies: the request to suspend trading and, where applicable, the disclosure of inside information. Any director or insider who personally shares sensitive information outside the strictly functional circle remains fully subject to the prohibition.
For the FSMA and other regulatory authorities. Sanction practices are shifting toward a proportionality test based on fundamental rights. A fine for disclosing inside information in a political or media context will have to be justified by balancing market integrity against freedom of speech, with particular restraint when it comes to political statements on matters of public interest.
Frequently asked questions (FAQ)
Is an ordinary citizen allowed to share inside information in order to spark a public debate?
Not necessarily. The exception requires a close connection to the normal performance of one’s work, profession, or position. The Court assesses the speaker’s role and function on a case-by-case basis. The protection therefore does not apply to everyone who invokes the public interest, but is specifically assessed based on the position of the person concerned and on the necessity and proportionality of the statement.
Does a political advantage count as a prohibited “benefit” under the Market Abuse Regulation?
No. The Court limits the concept of benefit or gain to an economic benefit that positively affects the financial situation of the speaker or closely associated persons. A purely political or electoral gain falls outside that definition and therefore does not preclude protection.
Does this ruling also protect other non-journalists, such as experts or commentators?
The ruling refers to “other forms of expression in the media” in an objective sense, regardless of the speaker’s status. In principle, therefore, this protection may also apply to experts or commentators who disseminate information of public interest in the media, subject in each case to the same conditions of necessity and proportionality.
Conclusion
The Court of Justice recognizes that the disclosure of inside information by a politician in the media may be exempt from the prohibition if it falls within the normal exercise of his or her duties and is therefore required by freedom of the press. The economic interpretation of the concept of “advantage” and the broad, objective interpretation of “other forms of expression in the media” significantly expand the scope of protection. At the same time, the focus shifts to the factual necessity and proportionality test, which the referring court must conduct and which leaves the outcome uncertain for the person concerned.
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