Can a judge ban a press article even before it is published?

A negative article in the press can do considerable damage to a person's reputation, especially at a crucial time such as an election or a business negotiation. Therefore, the reflex is often to go to court and ask for a publication ban.

The short answer? In Belgium, this is basically not possible.

The Belgian Constitution prohibits ‘prior censorship'. A judge cannot pre-emptively silence the press. A judgment of the Court of Appeal of Liege of 19 June 2025 strongly confirms this rule.

The facts: a politician, an article and a publication ban

The case that led to the ruling was particularly delicate. A mayoral candidate and list leader for local elections was contacted by a journalist a few days before the ballot. The journalist planned to publish an article about a judicial investigation into the politician for tax fraud.

The politician feared irreparable damage to reputation and influencing election results. He immediately went to the president of the court of first instance via a unilateral petition and asked that the publication of the article be “provisionally suspended”.

The decision: the first judge's turn and the court's correction

The first judge: an (impossible) balancing act

In an initial decision (and later confirmed after a dissenting debate) the judge vindicated the politician. The court ordered the newspaper (Le Soir) to temporarily stop publication of the article.

The judge justified this by stating that there was no “censorship as in a dictatorship,” but “punctual judicial intervention” to settle a conflict between two fundamental rights:

1. The right to freedom of speech (of the press).
2. The right to respect for private life and reputation (of the politician).

The judge ruled that the publication, so shortly before the election and based on a secret file, seemed to insinuate a “will to harm.” He stated that the “public interest” was not served by the publication at that time.

Court of appeal: the Constitution is absolute

The publisher appealed the decision. The Court of Appeal of Liege completely reformed the first judge's decision.

The court overturned the publication ban and declared the politician's original claim unfounded. The court's reasoning was crystal clear and direct:

1. This is indeed censorship: The requested measure is a textbook example of “prior censorship” (un censure préalable).
2. The Constitution prohibits this: Both Articles 19 and 25 of the Belgian Constitution prohibit this kind of preventive measure. The Constitution only allows abuses of press freedom to be punished afterwards (a posteriori), not to prohibit them beforehand (a priori).
3. The ECHR also provides no basis: The court also analyzed Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). While the ECHR does theoretically permit preventive restrictions, it requires that such a restriction be “proscribed by law” (the legality requirement).
4. There is no law: The court explicitly refers to the RTBF v. Belgium ruling of the European Court of Human Rights (April 29, 2011). In that ruling, the ECtHR already established that Belgian law (such as the general rules governing summary proceedings) does not provide a sufficiently clear and predictable legal basis for allowing a judge to impose a preventive publication ban.
5. Conclusion: Because there is no legal basis, the first condition of the ECHR is not met and the measure is illegal.

Legal analysis and interpretation

This case exposes the heart of a fundamental legal debate in Belgium: the “monist” versus the “dualist” view of press freedom.

• The dualist view (of the first judge): This movement, which emerged in the late 20th century, argues that the absolute prohibition of censorship in Article 25 of the Constitution (from 1831) should be “balanced” against other equally important fundamental rights, such as the right to privacy (Art. 22 Constitution). According to this view, a judge would be allowed to intervene pre-emptively to prevent an irreversible violation of those other rights.
• The monistic view (of the court of appeal): This view, staying true to the text of the Constitution, states that the prohibition against censorship is absolute and tolerates no exceptions. The legislators of the Constitution of 1831 wanted to shield the press from any form of judicial interference prior to publication, allowing sanctions only after publication.

The dualist view, although academically interesting, encounters an insurmountable obstacle in practice: the aforementioned RTBF v. Belgium ruling.

In 2011, the European Court of Human Rights clearly stated that, even if one wanted to weigh up rights, the Belgian legal framework simply does not currently provide for this. A judge who nevertheless prohibits publication today is therefore acting without a clear legal basis and thereby violating Article 10 ECHR.

This case, like previous cases (such as those involving Conner Rousseau), reveals a tendency for politicians to use summary proceedings to censor the press in practice.

The only way to enable preventive bans would be a revision of the Constitution itself. However, this would then open a dangerous door and significantly increase the risk of strategic lawsuits to muzzle the press (so-called ‘SLAPPs’).

Thus, in the present state of the law, the conclusion is absolute: a judge cannot and should not impose a preventive publication ban on the press.

What this specifically means

• For the press (journalists and publishers): Your right to publish without prior judicial review is very strongly protected by the Constitution. This ruling confirms that you cannot be forced to stop an article, even by a judge in summary proceedings. However, this does not mean impunity: you remain fully responsible after publication (a posteriori) for what you write and can be sued for slander, defamation or invasion of privacy.
• For citizens and public figures: You cannot ask a judge to stop an article that harms you before publication. Constitutional protections for the press weigh more heavily at that point. Your legal options lie after publication. You can bring an action for damages (based on Article 6.6-6.7 of the Civil Code), demand a right of reply , or (in theory) file a criminal complaint for a press crime.

Frequently asked questions (FAQ)

What is the difference between the prohibition in the Belgian Constitution (Art. 25) and the ECHR (Art. 10)?
Article 25 of the Constitution is absolute: “censorship can never be introduced.” It prohibits any preventive measure. Article 10 ECHR, which guarantees freedom of expression, does allow exceptions in its second paragraph (such as for the protection of the reputation or rights of others), provided they are “prescribed by law” and “necessary in a democratic society.” The Belgian Constitution is therefore stricter on this point and offers more protection to the press than the ECHR.

So can a judge never prohibit a publication?
In the context of the press (newspapers, online articles, reports), a preventive injunction (in advance) is precluded by the Constitutional prohibition against censorship. However, a judge may rule that a text once published is unlawful and order its further distribution (e.g., the sale of a book). The Court of Cassation has ruled in the past that this is no longer ‘censorship’ because the opinion has already been expressed and the measure is repressive (punitive) in nature.

What if an article violates my privacy or the secrecy of investigation?
Even then, the prohibition against prior censorship applies. The court of appeals explicitly stated in this ruling that it is not for the judge in summary proceedings to examine whether a journalist has violated the secrecy of investigation or his professional secrecy to justify a preemptive ban. The only sanction for such a violation can take place after publication, through civil or criminal proceedings.

Conclusion

The judgment of the Liège Court of Appeal is a powerful and necessary reminder of the foundations of our press freedom. The Belgian constitutional prohibition of censorship is absolute and also applies in court.

While there may be a temptation to ask a judge to stop a harmful article, this is not a viable legal path. The focus should be on the actions that are possible after publication.