How specifically should you formulate your arguments in an appeal against the Data Protection Authority?

If you disagree with a decision of the Data Protection Authority (DPA), you can appeal to the Market Court. But what formal requirements must this appeal meet in order not to be immediately declared inadmissible? A ruling of Feb. 25, 2026, confirms that the threshold for admissibility is relatively low even if the legal argument is summary, although this does not mean that it will mean that the claim will also be found substantively well-founded.

The facts and legal context

The dispute arose after a citizen filed a complaint with the DPA against a collection agency. The citizen invoked the right to be forgotten (the right to data erasure). However, the DPA Litigation Chamber decided to dismiss the complaint under Article 95, § 1, 3° of the Act establishing the DPA (AED).

The DPA justified this dismissal by stating that the complaint was a collateral dispute constituted in a broader dispute over an alleged late payment. According to the DPA, a civil court or other authority was better placed to review the entire case.

The citizen did not stop there and filed an appeal with the Market Court.

The decision and the regulations

It was noteworthy that the petitioner did so without an attorney, did not subsequently file any briefs (extensive legal arguments) and did not even show up at the hearing. The DPA raised that the petition for appeal was null and void. According to the authority, the document did not comply with Article 1034ter of the Judicial Code, because a clear summary of the pleas (the legal arguments) would be lacking

Thus, the Market Court had to rule on the validity of the petition in the first place. The AED imposes a 30-day deadline to appeal, but otherwise does not specify any formal requirements for the writ of initiation. Therefore, one falls back on the general procedural law.

According to Article 1057, 7° and Article 1034ter, §4 of the Judicial Code, a petition must contain, under penalty of nullity, a statement of the grievances and a brief summary of the pleas. The Market Court ruled that this should not be interpreted extremely strictly. It is sufficient that the applicant makes clear why he feels aggrieved and at least summarily lists his pleas so that the DPA can defend itself and the court can verify the scope. Since the petitioner had listed six pleas (objections), the Court deemed this sufficiently clear as a prelude to debate. Thus, the petition was valid and admissible.

Nevertheless, the applicant drew the short straw on the merits. The Court held that the DPA had correctly applied its power to dismiss complaints (the expediency principle), since the complaint was only a collateral dispute of a broader discussion about a late payment.

Legal analysis and interpretation

This ruling illustrates a fascinating and topical tension between the approachability of justice on the one hand and the demands of quality legal debate on the other.

In this particular ruling, the Market Court applies a remarkably flexible interpretation of Articles 1034ter and 744 of the Judicial Code. The Court here applies the well-known adage Da mihi factum, dabo tibi ius (give me the facts, I'll give you the law) very broadly. This contrasts sharply with proceedings before, for example, the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State, where the procedural regulations explicitly requires that the petitioner already point out the concrete violation of a rule of law in the petition. Thus, federal regulators (such as the DPA, FSMA or NBB) are seemingly subject to a more forgiving access-to-justice regime through the Market Court.

Yet this flexibility must be greatly qualified. Legal access is low-key, but certainly not completely form-free. Indeed, it is worth noting that the Market Court in previous case law did rule that a petition was void for lack of sufficient qualitative means. Thus, there is indeed an absolute legal bottom line. A rudimentary enumeration of grievances may suffice as an impetus for debate, but a petition that is substantially deficient in the formulation of its objections will fail inexorably.

Moreover, the crux of the case concerned the DPA's authority to close (dismiss) complaints without action. The Court emphasized that the DPA may use its own prioritization. Where a complaint is only one part of a larger private law dispute (such as debt collection), the DPA may legitimately judge that its intervention is not efficient or expedient . This is in line with section 57.1.f of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which states that an authority investigates complaints “to the extent appropriate”.

A final legal point from this ruling concerns the rejection of the claim for abuse of process. At the hearing itself, the DPA claimed damages of 1,800 euros because the applicant delayed the proceedings by not showing up and not replying. The Court decisively rejected this. A claim for damages or the imposition of useless costs (article 780bis and article 1017 Jud. C.) must at all times respect the principle of adversarial proceedings. Because the DPA made this claim only at the hearing-and not beforehand in its written conclusions-the absent applicant could not defend himself against it. The Court therefore refused to accede to this claim.

What this specifically means

This ruling has important implications for both citizens and businesses involved in DPA proceedings:

  • For the citizen (complainant): You do not have to be an accomplished attorney to have an appeal declared admissible in the Market Court. A clear list of points why you disagree with the DPA may suffice. However, to win effectively, you must be able to show that the DPA overstepped its bounds or manifestly misjudged the facts.
  • For regulators: You cannot simply assume that a poorly drafted layperson's petition will be invalidated by the court. You will need to prepare on the merits. In addition, you must include any claims for aggravated and reckless litigation or abuse of process in your briefs promptly and in writing. If you do not do so until the hearing, you will miss the boat.

Frequently asked questions (FAQ)

May the DPA refuse to address the substance of my complaint?
Yes, the DPA has discretion and has its own dismissal policy. It can autonomously decide to close a complaint without further action if a follow-up investigation is not appropriate, for example, if the impact is limited or if it is a collateral dispute that should really be decided by another judge.

Can I appeal the DPA myself without an attorney?
Yes, this is possible. The Market Court does not have insurmountable formal requirements for the wording of your arguments in the petition, as long as it is clear to the opposing party what you are opposing

Can I be fined if I start proceedings but fail to show up at the hearing?
This is possible. The law (article 780bis Jud. C.) provides penalties for abuse of process. However, the opposing party or the judge must always first give you the opportunity to defend yourself against this (the right of contradiction). As a rule, such a claim cannot be demanded for the first time orally at the hearing if you are absent.

What is the cost of an appeal at the Market Court?
The losing party is usually ordered to pay the costs. In this case, the rolling fee was 400 euros and a contribution of 26 euros to the Budget Fund was due.

Conclusion

This ruling confirms that the threshold to court in Belgium remains low in data protection cases, but also reminds us that an admissible appeal does not automatically lead to winning. The DPA's discretion remains a tough legal hurdle.


Joris Deene

Attorney-partner at Everest Attorneys

Contact

Questions? Need advice?
Contact Attorney Joris Deene.

Phone: 09/280.20.68
E-mail: joris.deene@everest-law.be

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