Can FIFA’s player agent regulations restrict agents’ fees, licenses, and personal information?

On July 16, 2026, the Court of Justice (C-209/23) ruled that FIFA’s rules for player agents conflict with European competition law, the free movement of services, and data protection law. In the case of the German agent FT and the company RRC Sports v. FIFA, the Court held that a private sports federation is not free to use its regulations to control the agent market. The answer is therefore nuanced: some rules are permissible, others are not, and in each case it depends on an assessment under Articles 56, 101, and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 6 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

The facts

FT is a player agent and vice president of the agents’ association The Football Forum. Together with RRC Sports, a German company that also acts as an agent and of which FT is a director, he filed a lawsuit in the Mainz Regional Court. FIFA is the global governing body for soccer, with 211 national associations as members, including Germany’s Deutscher Fußball-Bund. These associations are required by their bylaws to adhere to FIFA’s rules.

On December 16, 2022, the FIFA Council adopted the FIFA Football Agent Regulations (FFAR), the regulations governing the activities, compensation, and conduct of agents. FT and RRC Sports asked a German court to prohibit FIFA from applying thirteen of those rules, arguing that they conflict with EU law. The German court stayed the proceedings and referred a single broad preliminary question to the Court of Justice regarding the compatibility of that set of rules with four provisions of EU law.

The decision

The Court first recalls a principle it has already established in previous sports cases: Article 165 TFEU, which recognizes the specific characteristics of sports, does not exempt sports from the general economic law of the Union (CJEU, December 21, 2023, C-333/21, European Superleague Company, EU:C:2023:1011). As soon as a regulation affects an economic activity, it falls under Articles 56, 101, and 102 of the TFEU, even if it was issued by a sports federation. The activity of agents, who match players and coaches with clubs for a fee, is such an economic activity. The regulations therefore fall within the scope of those Treaty provisions.

For the purposes of Article 101 TFEU, the Court classifies FIFA as an association of undertakings and the FFAR as a decision by an association of undertakings. It then examines, category by category, whether the rules restrict competition.

Compensation, license, multiple representation, solicitation, and information

The Court divides the disputed rules into five categories and reviews them separately. According to the Court, most of the rules do not constitute a restriction of competition “by object,” meaning they are not so harmful that an examination of their effects is unnecessary. For example, the Court rules that the cap on agent fees under Article 15(2) of the FFAR does not constitute a restriction by object, because it does not impose a fixed maximum but rather a relative cap, proportional to the salary or transfer fee, which may increase accordingly. The rules on multiple representation and most licensing conditions also do not fall under that classification.

The Court does, however, consider only two provisions—subject to verification by the national court—to constitute a restriction by effect. The first is the provision in Article 14(12)(a) of the FFAR, insofar as it deprives an agent of the portion of his fee already due if the player subsequently transfers to another club, even if that agent played no role whatsoever in that new transfer. According to the Court, such an arbitrary loss of an earned fee is, by its very nature, harmful to competition (in line with the ECJ judgment of October 4, 2024, C-650/22, FIFA, EU:C:2024:824). The second is the rule of approximation set forth in Article 16, paragraph 1, subparagraphs (b) and (c) of the FFAR, but only because it does not apply to real estate agents who already have an exclusive contract themselves: this gives them an unfair advantage over their competitors.

For all other rules, an examination of the specific consequences is required, which is the responsibility of the referring court. Where a restriction is identified, it may still be exempt from the prohibition if it serves a legitimate objective of general interest and is proportionate, or if it meets the four conditions for exemption set forth in Article 101(3) of the TFEU. Objectives such as protecting inexperienced players and avoiding conflicts of interest may constitute such legitimate objectives; a purely economic aim, such as driving down agents' costs, cannot.

Dominant position, freedom to provide services, and data

Under Article 102 TFEU, the Court finds that FIFA holds a dominant position in the markets affected by the FFAR, even though FIFA itself is not active in those markets as an undertaking. That dominant position stems from its regulatory, supervisory, and sanctioning powers. It is for the national court to determine whether the contested rules constitute an abuse of that dominant position, whether through exclusion or exploitation.

Under Article 56 TFEU, the Court finds that certain rules constitute an obstacle to the freedom to provide services: the restriction on multiple representation, the licensing requirement regarding criminal and disciplinary records, and the proximity rule. The fee rules do not in themselves constitute an obstacle, merely because less stringent rules were conceivable.

Finally, under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR, the Court examines the rules requiring agents to post data on the FIFA platform (Article 16(2) of the FFAR) and requiring FIFA to disclose certain information (Article 19 of the FFAR). The Court concludes that the GDPR precludes two provisions of Article 19 of the FFAR: the publication of any sanctions imposed on agents or their clients, and the publication of the detailed details of all transactions involving agents.

Legal analysis and interpretation

The reimbursement cap remains in place because it adjusts accordingly

The biggest surprise lies in what the Court does not classify as an infringement. A price cap agreed upon jointly by competitors sounds like a textbook example of a prohibited agreement. However, one technical detail saved the rule: the cap is not set in euros, but as a percentage of the player’s salary or transfer fee. If a club pays more for a player, the agent is also allowed to earn more. The cap therefore fluctuates with the market.

That distinction is more pronounced than it seems. The Advocate General referred to this in his opinion of May 15, 2025 as a “dynamic maximum price” and pointed out that there is no consensus—neither in case law nor in the economic literature—on whether agreements on maximum prices are inherently harmful. The Court follows this cautious line of reasoning: a relative cap does not prevent agents from competing on price or quality, and therefore an impact assessment is necessary. Anyone who reads the ruling as a green light for price caps in sports is jumping to conclusions: the Court merely states that such a cap is not prohibited a priori, not that it remains permissible after the impact assessment.

The real violations lie in the details, not in the overarching principle

It is striking that the two provisions the Court does classify as limitations on scope are both minor, almost technical provisions. The first deprives an agent of a fee to which he was already entitled, simply because the player later signs with another club, without that agent having anything further to do with it. The Court explicitly links this to its October 4, 2024, ruling in the FIFA case, in which it characterized a similar arbitrary loss of rights as harmful to competition. The second rule prohibits agents from approaching a competitor’s clients outside a two-month window, but does not impose that same restriction on agents who already have an exclusive contract themselves. This asymmetry favors the established agent and thus distorts the balance of supply and demand.

The lesson is that the most serious competition law issues do not lie in the high-profile caps, but in provisions that appear neutral at first glance. A set of rules can remain largely valid yet be invalidated by a single detail, precisely because that detail treats a category of market participants differently for no good reason.

A federation can abuse a market in which it isn't even present

Under Article 102 TFEU, the Court takes a landmark step. FIFA itself does not sell agency services and does not act as a competitor to agents. Nevertheless, according to the Court, it holds a dominant position in that market—not because it engages in commercial activity there, but because it sets the rules of the game, monitors compliance, and enforces them through sanctions. The gatekeeper’s power is sufficient, even without its own presence on the playing field.

The Advocate General put it even more explicitly: whoever, in fact, determines the conditions under which others enter a market and how they compete there is exercising a regulatory function that must be strictly defined, regardless of whether that party is itself active in that market. This is an important confirmation for anyone dealing with private standard-setting bodies: certifying professional organizations, quality mark administrators, and platform operators. Regulatory power is market power, even without a product of one’s own.

Transparency toward agents is not, in and of itself, a legitimate interest

The data protection provision deserves special attention, as it extends far beyond the realm of sports. The Court acknowledges that FIFA has a legitimate interest in verifying whether agents and their clients comply with the rules, and that it may collect data on its platform for that purpose. However, the Court draws the line at Article 19 of the FFAR, which makes some of that data public.

The publication of every sanction imposed on an agent or client goes too far, because it does not distinguish based on the severity of the violation and does not cease after a certain period of time. Furthermore, the publication of the details of all transactions conflicts with the principle of data minimization set forth in Article 5(1)(c) of the GDPR: the scope of such publication is not defined. The Advocate General added a consideration that the Court does not explicitly adopt, but which strikes at the heart of the matter: if competitors can view each other’s fees and transactions, this could actually encourage collusion and unfair competition. Transparency is then no longer a virtue, but a competitive risk. For anyone who wishes to base data processing on “transparency,” this is a useful warning: transparency vis-à-vis a government is different from transparency among competitors, and its purpose must be specifically identified in each case.

Specifically, what does this mean?

For player agents. The ruling provides ammunition to challenge the most controversial aspects of the FFAR, but it is not a free pass. The compensation caps are not automatically struck down; their fate depends on the impact assessment by the national court. Where you do have a strong case is regarding the rule that strips you of compensation you’ve already earned following a subsequent transfer, and regarding the disclosure of your commercial data and sanctions. Keep evidence of the specific burden these rules impose on you, because that burden is precisely what the court must weigh.

For sports federations and other private standard-setting organizations. Regulatory power over a market constitutes market power, even without a commercial presence of one’s own. A regulation that governs access to a profession or the conditions of competition must be able to justify each individual rule on the basis of a genuine—not merely economic—public interest, and as the least restrictive measure necessary to achieve that objective. A package that appears useful “as a whole” does not provide sufficient justification: each provision is assessed separately.

For anyone who bases data processing on legitimate interests. The three-step test set forth in Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR—legitimate interest, necessity, and balancing of interests—remains central. Anyone wishing to disclose data must limit the group of recipients to those who truly need it, define the scope of the disclosure, and take into account the reasonable expectations of the data subject. An undifferentiated disclosure of sanctions, without distinction based on severity or the passage of time, does not meet this test.

Frequently asked questions (FAQ)

Can a sports federation set a cap on agents' fees?
Not prohibited in advance, but not automatically permitted either. The Court ruled that a cap that is proportional to the salary or transfer fee—and thus fluctuates with the market—is not a restriction “by object.” Whether it does in fact restrict competition, and whether it can then be justified or exempted, must be assessed by the national court based on the specific consequences.

Can an organization abuse a dominant position in a market in which it is not itself active?
Yes. According to the Court of Justice, it is sufficient for the organization to determine the rules of that market through its regulatory, supervisory, and sanctioning powers. It does not need to offer goods or services on that market itself to hold a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU.

Under the GDPR, is an organization permitted to publish the sanctions imposed on its members?
Only within certain limits. An undifferentiated publication of every sanction, without distinction based on the severity of the violation and without a time limit, does not meet the requirements of Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR. Furthermore, sanctions relating to criminal convictions are subject to the additional safeguards set forth in Article 10 of the GDPR.

Conclusion

The ruling confirms that the autonomy of sports federations ends where EU economic law begins, and that each rule must be assessed individually, not the regulations as a whole. The compensation caps remain in place for now, two minor provisions are struck down as anti-competition violations, and the data section reveals a general lesson about the limits of transparency. The practical implications extend far beyond soccer, to any private organization that regulates a market or processes data on the basis of a legitimate interest.