Joris DeeneThe correctional court has jurisdiction to try doxing - the Court of Cassation stated in a ruling of June 4, 2025. But jurisdiction is not the same as conviction. In a ruling dated March 11, 2026, the Court of Appeal of Liege acquitted the defendant in the same case of all charges. This ruling brings an important nuance: even when someone disseminates personal data online and an avalanche of hate reactions follows, the legal requirements for defamation are not automatically met.
The facts
The case goes back to Feb. 24, 2016. On that day, the founder of the satirical website Nordpresse publishes a message in response to an article in a daily newspaper of the Sudpresse group. The message contains the photo of the journalist who had signed the article, her name and the municipality where she lived. The accompanying text stamps the article as a “rag” and wishes her surroundings “much courage”.
In the days that follow, the journalist receives a stream of hate messages and threats on social media from third parties. She is filing a complaint for harassment and is bringing a civil action.
After a long procedural battle - during which the correctional court was initially declared incompetent, followed by a ruling in regulation of jurisdiction by the Court of Cassation on June 4, 2025 that upheld correctional jurisdiction - the Court of Appeal in Liège ruled on the merits of the case on March 11, 2026.
The decision
The Liège Court of Appeal acquitted the defendant of both counts.
Count A - unlawful use of a legally recorded telecommunication (art. 314bis §2, al. 2 Cc.)
The defendant had legally recorded a telephone conversation with an editor of Sudpresse and then published it online. For criminality under Article 314bis §2 of the Criminal Code , it is required that the use of the recording was done with fraudulent intent (intent to gain an undue advantage for oneself or others) or fraudulent insight (intent to harm others).
The court notes that neither intention was proven. The publication is part of a journalistic critical approach: the defendant wanted to show that Sudpresse sought to intimidate his publication. The mere knowledge that the publication could provoke inadequate reactions from some readers does not suffice to prove the required special intent.
Indictment B - stalking (art. 442bis, al. 1 Cc.)
Article 442bis of the Criminal Code punishes any person who seriously interferes with the privacy of a person by annoyingly harassing him, when he knew or should have known that by doing so he would seriously disturb the peace of that person.
The court noted that the defendant had published only the municipality - not the full address - of the journalist, and that this information was already accessible through public sources such as her LinkedIn profile. The mere publication of February 24, 2016, in its context - a satirical website aimed at criticizing journalistic practices of Sudpresse - is not of a nature to be objectively qualified in itself as seriously disturbing to personal privacy.
Crucially, further, the nuisance experienced by the journalist came from autonomous third parties, and not from repeated or persistent conduct by the defendant himself. Indeed, harassment requires “persistent or repeated conduct,” or at least one course of conduct whose nature entails incessant or recurring consequences attributable to the defendant (Cass. Oct. 29, 2013). That requirement was not met in this case.
Legal analysis and interpretation
On June 4, 2025, the Court of Cassation had ruled exclusively on the jurisdictional question - specifically, whether the offenses should be classified as printing press crime or common stalking. The Court answered that question in favor of correctional jurisdiction. The Court of Cassation did not rule on the merits of the charges. The Court of Appeal of Liège, as the referring court, then had to assess the facts on the merits - and reached an acquittal.
The test under Section 442bis Cc.
The acquittal for stalking sheds light on the material components of Section 442bis Cc. and how they are applied in the context of online publications.
The court applies an objective test: the conduct, regardless of the victim's subjective perception, must be objective in nature to seriously disturb personal privacy. The mere fact that the journalist received hate reactions after the publication is not sufficient. The court must consider whether those consequences are attributable to the defendant's own conduct or to the autonomous actions of third parties.
This is particularly relevant to the qualification of so-called brigading or pile-on phenomena: when an initial publication provokes a mass response from third parties, the question is not whether the harm was real - it unmistakably was - but whether the initial publication in its own characteristics (repetition, nature, extent of the data disseminated) fulfills the components of stalking.
The public nature of the data
The court attaches importance to the fact that some of the data distributed - the municipality and the photograph - were already publicly available. This is an important factual element in assessing the seriousness of the invasion of privacy. Re-using already publicly accessible information, even if with an unfriendly intent, does not necessarily carry the weight of a serious privacy violation in the criminal sense.
That said, such behavior in other contexts - where non-public data is disseminated, or where the defendant himself is acting repeatedly - may well be actionable.
What this specifically means
For victims of online hate campaigns
An acquittal in this case does not mean that doxing or online stalking are legally elusive. However, this ruling does teach that a strong criminal case for stalking requires that:
- the defendant himself has repeatedly or continuously acted, or has engaged in conduct whose nature in itself entails incessant consequences;
- the disseminated data were not already publicly available;
- the nuisance demonstrably results directly from the behavior of the defendant, and not merely from autonomous reactions of third parties.
Those who are victims of a coordinated online attack would do well to build a detailed record of all individual behaviors, with timestamps and retention of screenshots, so that the repetitive or persistent nature of the acts can be demonstrated.
For the defendant party
The ruling shows that the mere dissemination of partly public personal data, in a satirical or journalistic-critical context, is not in itself sufficient for a conviction for stalking. The intent and objective impact of the conduct remain decisive.
For journalists and media
The ruling confirms that journalistic criticism - including sharp criticism - enjoys broad protection. Whoever criticizes an article, even forcefully, does not in principle commit a criminal offense. The limit lies where personal data is used as an instrument to provoke intimidation by third parties, and where that use itself fulfills the material components of a criminal offense.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can I press charges for stalking if I receive online hate comments in response to a publication about me?
Yes, filing a report is always possible. Whether a prosecution is likely to succeed depends on the facts: the judge will consider whether the defendant's initial conduct itself fulfills the components of stalking, or whether the damage is solely the result of the autonomous action of third parties. A detailed evidence file is indispensable for this purpose.
Does it make a difference if the disseminated data was already public somewhere?
Yes, the Liège Court of Appeal considered this relevant in assessing the seriousness of the invasion of privacy. Completely private data leaked out outweighs information that was already accessible through public sources.
Is there a civil avenue besides criminal law?
Certainly. Anyone harmed by the dissemination of personal data or an online hate campaign can also bring a civil action based on extra-contractual liability, or file a complaint with the Data Protection Authority for violation of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Those avenues are open regardless of the outcome of criminal proceedings.
Conclusion
The ruling of the Liege Court of Appeal of March 11, 2026 provides an important addition to the Cassation ruling of June 4, 2025: the correctional court has jurisdiction to assess doxing and stalking, but a conviction presupposes that all the legal elements have been proven. The mere dissemination of partly public personal data, followed by responses from autonomous third parties, does not suffice for this purpose. Anyone seeking effective protection against online harassment in Belgium needs a legally based case that puts the perpetrator's own conduct in the crosshairs.
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