A judge cannot simply prohibit a critic from speaking out on a matter of public interest while the trial on the merits is ongoing. On September 29, 2026, the Court of First Instance of West Flanders, Bruges Division, rejected such a preliminary gag order: a prior injunction interferes so profoundly with the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights that it is permissible only if the unlawfulness of the statements is already clearly established. Real estate developer Bart Versluys and two companies from his group sought such an injunction against former alderman Yves Miroir, subject to a penalty of 15,000 euros per violation. Their request was denied.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In short:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The dispute centers on a plot of land on the Oosteroever in Ostend, between the Vuurtorendok, Fortstraat, and Vuurtorenweg. That site is part of a broader urban development project and, according to the 2009 regional spatial implementation plan, is designated as an urban development area. A company belonging to Bart Versluys\u2019s group acquired it from the Autonomous Municipal Enterprise for Urban Renewal in Ostend, following a public selection procedure that was announced throughout Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The site is located within the perimeter of the landscape surrounding Fort Napoleon, which is located at Royal Decree of July 6, 1976<\/a> was protected. The parties agree on that fact; they disagree on the scope of that protection. Meanwhile, the Flemish Minister of Immovable Heritage has extended protection to part of the area permanently discontinued<\/a>, but that decision plays no role in the judgment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yves Miroir served as an alderman and city council member in Ostend for many years. Since 2023, he has repeatedly voiced critical opinions regarding the development of the site and the broader Oosteroever area: regarding the planned construction, the manner in which the site was acquired, and the impact on the surrounding area. This sparked a public debate, conducted through press publications, social media, public communications, and protests, in which citizens and organizations also participated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Versluys, Vuurtorendok NV, and Versluys Invest NV considered several of those statements to be factually incorrect and harmful to their reputation and their interests as a project developer. In a summons dated March 27, 2026, they filed claims on the merits. In addition, they requested, as a preliminary injunction pending the final judgment, that Miroir be prohibited from continuing to disseminate three specific allegations: that the land was purchased in violation of public procurement regulations and without a transparent procedure; that Versluys caused a valuable dune landscape to disappear; and that the conservation order does not permit construction on the site. Each violation would be subject to a penalty of 15,000 euros. Miroir responded that its statements are part of a public debate on matters of general interest and that they consist, in whole or in part, of value judgments or defensible positions. The case was heard on September 1, 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The judgment (District Court of West Flanders (Bruges Division), September 29, 2026, 26\/977\/A) concerns solely that provisional measure. The court bases its decision on Article 19, paragraph 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure<\/a>. An interim measure within the meaning of that provision is a measure that the court may order at any stage of the proceedings to provisionally regulate the parties\u2019 situation pending its decision on the merits. In doing so, the court does not make a final ruling on the parties\u2019 rights: it merely examines, at first glance, whether there is a prima facie case justifying the measure. The plaintiff is therefore not required to provide full proof of his claim, but, according to the court, must demonstrate that his claim on the merits is sufficiently plausible and that temporary intervention by the court is necessary to safeguard his rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Added to this is the principle of proportionality. The more far-reaching the requested measure, the stronger the appearance of legality must be and the more clearly the necessity must be demonstrated. If the measure significantly infringes upon fundamental rights or substantially preempts the substantive assessment, the court holds that particular restraint is warranted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to the court, the measure in question directly affects freedom of speech, which is guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights<\/a> and Article 19 of the Constitution<\/a>. That freedom also protects statements that are offensive, shocking, or disturbing, and carries even greater weight when such statements contribute to a debate of public interest. The court documents showed that the contested statements concern a large-scale urban development project, the spatial planning of the Oosteroever, the protection of nature and heritage, and the manner in which public lands were developed. According to the court, these issues undeniably fall within the scope of public debate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The decisive factor was the nature of the claim. The plaintiffs did not seek compensation or redress for statements that had already been made, but rather an injunction prohibiting the defendant from making certain types of statements on the subject in the future. According to the court, such an order constitutes a particularly far-reaching interference: it does not sanction a statement that has already been made, but rather prevents future communication. According to the court, a prior gag order can only be justified if it is already sufficiently clear at this stage that the statements in question are unlawful, and if the necessity of immediate intervention has been sufficiently demonstrated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Those conditions were not met. There is a genuine and serious dispute between the parties regarding the factual accuracy of the statements, the historical condition of the site, the scope of the 1976 preservation order, the course of the sale proceedings, and the context of the statements. This dispute requires an examination of the facts, the documents, and the arguments, and, according to the court, that examination is part of the substantive proceedings. Furthermore, at least some of the statements take the form of evaluations, interpretations, and viewpoints regarding cultural heritage, nature conservation, land-use planning, and government policy. Even if phrased in a sharp, polemical, or one-sided manner, the court held that such statements fall, in principle, within the scope of protection afforded by freedom of speech. Whether Miroir has exceeded the limits of that freedom depends on the factual basis of its allegations, the precise wording, the context, the status of the parties involved, and their contribution to the public debate. That assessment cannot be made without prejudging the merits of the case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The court therefore dismissed the motion for preliminary relief as unfounded, referred the case to a hearing on the merits, and reserved its decision on costs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The plaintiffs asked the court to issue a preliminary injunction prohibiting a politician from repeating three statements. The court treated this request as a matter of proportionality under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights: a prior gag order is permissible, but only if the unlawfulness is already clear. The word \u201ccensorship\u201d does not appear in the ruling, and Article 25 of the Constitution<\/a>, which stipulates that censorship can never be instituted, is not mentioned.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Miroir could, however, have gone a step further and argued that, under current Belgian law, the court is not permitted to impose such a ban at all. The European Court of Human Rights ruled against Belgium in the RTBF judgment (ECHR, March 29, 2011, 50084\/06<\/a>) precisely on that point. A judge in summary proceedings had prohibited the broadcast of a television report, and the Court of Cassation had upheld that prohibition (Supreme Court, June 2, 2006, C.03.0211.F<\/a>) arguing that the general provisions on jurisdiction in the Code of Civil Procedure constitute a sufficiently precise legal basis. The European Court took a different view. Article 19 of the Constitution permits only the retroactive punishment of crimes committed in the exercise of freedom, and Articles 18, 19, 584, and 1039 of the Judicial Code say nothing about the type of restrictions that are permitted, their purpose, their duration, their scope, or the oversight thereof. In the absence of a precise legal framework for prior prohibitions, and given the conflicting Belgian case law, the interference was unforeseeable and therefore not provided for by law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That criticism also applies to the basis the court relies on here. Article 19, paragraph 3, of the Judicial Code is just such a general provision on jurisdiction; the European Court of Justice even explicitly referred to it. Moreover, the Constitutional Court had already ruled in 2004 that the prohibition on preventive measures in Articles 19 and 25 of the Constitution means that a court may only intervene once dissemination has already occurred (GwH, October 6, 2004, 157\/2004<\/a>). In his article-by-article commentary on the Constitution, J. Velaers concludes that judges presiding over summary proceedings must refrain from imposing publication and broadcast bans as long as the legislature has not established a clear framework (J. VELAERS, The Constitution. A Commentary Article by Article. Volume I, Bruges, die Keure, 2019, 550\u2013552).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nevertheless, the court\u2019s reasoning holds up, for two reasons. First, this case does not involve a ban on a publication that has not yet appeared, but rather a ban on repeating statements that have already been made. That is not pure prior censorship. The Court of Cassation ruled that removing a magazine that has already been distributed from circulation does not constitute censorship (Supreme Court, June 29, 2000, C.98.0530.F<\/a>), and the European Court accepted in the same case that such a measure was foreseeable after the information was disseminated (Leempoel judgment, ECHR, November 9, 2006, 64772\/01<\/a>). Velaers also counts a prohibition on repetition following actual dissemination among the measures that are permissible. However, a ban on future statements on a subject falls between these two categories, and the court itself acknowledges this: the order is not intended to sanction a statement that has already been made but to prevent future communication. Second, through the proportionality test, the court reaches the same conclusion as those who rule out the ban on principle. By requiring that the unlawfulness be clearly established at this stage, while simultaneously determining that this question can only be answered on the merits, it effectively precludes a gag order in practice for any disputed statement in a public debate. This is a more cautious approach than ruling on Article 25 of the Constitution, and an understandable one for a single judge presiding in the court of first instance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Miroir is not a journalist but a politician, and the debate concerns a private company. Nevertheless, the court grants his statements the heightened protection that the European Court reserves for contributions to a debate of public interest. That is correct. The European Court already ruled in the Castells judgment (ECHR, April 23, 1992, 11798\/85<\/a>) that freedom of speech is particularly valuable to an elected representative, because that representative defends the interests of his or her constituents. Furthermore, this protection does not depend on who is speaking but on what is being discussed: land-use planning, heritage, and the development of public lands are issues that affect the public.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The fact that the criticism is directed at a private company does not make it any less subject to scrutiny. A company that acquires land from an autonomous municipal enterprise following a selection procedure announced at the European level and intends to build on it within a protected landscape exposes itself to public scrutiny. The threshold is, however, higher than for a politician facing criticism: the Court of Cassation requires that the decision demonstrate that the restriction, taking into account the context, the status of the parties, and other circumstances, meets a compelling social necessity and is proportionate (Supreme Court, April 27, 2007, C.06.0123.N<\/a>). The court refuses to make precisely that assessment at this stage, and that is consistent: whoever assesses proportionality must first determine whether the statements are false.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The distinction between facts and value judgments, which has existed since the Lingens decision (ECHR, July 8, 1986, 9815\/82<\/a>) is central to the matter appears in the judgment as the second reason for not intervening. A value judgment is an opinion that cannot be proven and for which one can only require that it have a sufficient factual basis. The three contested statements are not equal in that regard. The assertion that a dune landscape was valuable and has disappeared is largely a value judgment. The claim that the conservation order prohibits construction is partly a factual and partly a legal question, and the plaintiffs themselves dispute the scope of the 1976 order. The claim that the purchase violated public procurement regulations and lacked transparency is the most factual of the three and therefore also the most vulnerable for Miroir: the trial court will want to see supporting documents on this point. As long as those questions remain unresolved, the court cannot prohibit a politician from taking a position on the matter. As we discussed earlier in response to the question of whether whether a politician may call an organization \"far-right\"<\/a>, a sufficient factual basis is enough to support a strong value judgment in a public debate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The summons is dated March 27, 2026, the hearing is scheduled for September 1, 2026, and the judgment is dated September 29, 2026. Between the summons and the hearing, on June 22, 2026, the Act of May 30, 2026<\/a> in effect, which Directive (EU) 2024\/1069<\/a> revenue and inserts a chapter into the Judicial Code on the protection of persons involved in public debate against manifestly unfounded claims or abuse of procedural rights. According to the new Article 1385\/1, a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) is a proceeding initiated not to assert a right, but to prevent, restrict, or punish public debate through claims that are wholly or partially unfounded. The judgment does not mention that law, even though it had been in effect for more than two months on the day of the oral arguments. Pursuant to Article 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure<\/a> After all, its laws on the administration of justice apply to pending cases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This makes a difference for the remainder of the proceedings. In the main proceedings, Miroir may request the early dismissal of the claim on the grounds that it is manifestly unfounded, in which case the burden of proof that the claim is not manifestly unfounded falls on the plaintiffs. It may also request the posting of security, which the court, incidentally, orders precisely as a provisional measure within the meaning of Article 19, paragraph 3. One of the factors the court may consider when assessing abuse is the disproportionate nature of the claim, and another is the fact that proceedings are deliberately directed against a specific person. An injunction prohibiting the repetition of three statements, subject to a penalty of 15,000 euros per violation, sought against a politician personally, are factors that will be taken into account in that assessment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There is, however, a nuance to consider. The rejection of a preliminary injunction does not in itself make a proceeding a SLAPP suit. The court did not rule that the statements were lawful, but only that that question must be answered on the merits, and it made no mention of an abuse of the law. Even before the law took effect, the Antwerp Court of First Instance sanctioned a vexatious lawsuit under the rules governing vexatious and reckless litigation, as we discussed in our blog post about The SLAPP lawsuit without a transposition law<\/a>. That case involved a claim for 200,000 euros following a threat to seek 1.2 million. This case involves a developer who says he wants to have factually incorrect allegations corrected, and at least one of the three claims is a factual allegation. Whether the proceedings serve a legitimate purpose or are intended to silence a critic will be for the trial court to determine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For companies that face criticism in a public debate.<\/strong> In Belgium, the path to a preliminary gag order is virtually closed as soon as the criticism concerns a matter of public interest and the facts are disputed. Anyone who feels they have been wronged would be better off focusing their energy on the merits of the case: which statements are factual claims, which are opinions, and which pieces of evidence prove that a factual claim is incorrect. A claim limited to specific, demonstrably false facts has a better chance of success than a general injunction prohibiting discussion of a topic. Keep in mind that, as of June 22, 2026, legal proceedings against a participant in the public debate are themselves subject to scrutiny: a disproportionate claim, a high penalty, or bringing a lawsuit against an individual rather than an organization are factors that could be used against you. If you are unsure whether a planned claim will pass that test, that is the first thing we will assess for you. Often, a right of reply, a public retraction, or a targeted notice of default is more effective than a summons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For politicians, activists, and citizens who voice critical opinions.<\/strong> The ruling confirms that sharp criticism of a construction project, an acquisition procedure, or the degradation of a landscape is, in principle, protected\u2014even when it affects a private company and even when it is phrased in a polemical manner. That protection is not unlimited. It depends on the factual basis of your claims. Anyone who claims that a procedure was not conducted properly or that a plot of land is not suitable for development should have supporting documents: the implementation plan, the conservation order, or the selection documents. Formulate factual allegations carefully and express opinions freely. If you are nevertheless summoned to court, since the law of May 30, 2026, you have the right to early dismissal and security for costs, and you can request full reimbursement of your attorney\u2019s fees if the judge finds that there was an abuse of process. Explicitly invoke that law; the judge will not apply it automatically, as this ruling demonstrates. You can read more about these safeguards on our page about the anti-SLAPP law<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For those involved in litigation regarding a preliminary injunction.<\/strong> The ruling is a good example of the sliding scale that the court applies under Article 19, paragraph 3, of the Judicial Code: the more far-reaching the measure, the stronger the prima facie case must be. Anyone requesting a measure that affects a fundamental right or preempts the merits of the case must therefore provide more evidence than someone requesting a provisional measure. Conversely, it is sufficient for the defendant to demonstrate that the facts are seriously disputed. You can find the detailed background on our pages about the freedom of speech<\/a> and the media law<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In exceptional cases\u2014and rarely in practice. Under Article 19, paragraph 3, of the Judicial Code, a judge may order provisional measures, but a ban on future statements constitutes a serious infringement of freedom of speech. According to the Court of First Instance of West Flanders, this is only permissible when the unlawfulness of the statements has already been clearly established and immediate intervention is necessary. As soon as the facts are seriously disputed, this is not the case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yes, but mainly after the fact and on the merits. You can seek damages, a retraction, or an injunction against the repetition of factual claims that have been proven to be false. You cannot obtain a general injunction prohibiting further comments about your project if the criticism concerns a matter of public interest. Base your claim on specific, demonstrably false facts\u2014not on opinions\u2014and consider whether a right of reply or a public response might yield results more quickly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yes. According to the European Court of Human Rights, freedom of expression is particularly valuable for an elected representative, and criticism of a construction project, a procurement process, or the degradation of cultural heritage affects the public interest. However, the politician must have a sufficient factual basis for his allegations. Value judgments, even harsh ones, are broadly protected; factual statements that are demonstrably false may result in liability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A SLAPP is a lawsuit that is not intended to enforce a right but to silence a participant in the public debate. Effective June 22, 2026, the Act of May 30, 2026, incorporates safeguards against such lawsuits into the Judicial Code: early dismissal, security deposits, and full reimbursement of attorneys\u2019 fees in cases of abuse. Because, pursuant to Article 3 of the Judicial Code, procedural laws apply to pending cases, you may also invoke these safeguards in proceedings initiated before that date.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The West Flanders Court of First Instance has refused to issue a preliminary injunction prohibiting a politician from repeating three statements regarding a controversial construction project. A preliminary injunction may not prejudge the central issue of the main dispute, and that issue\u2014whether the statements are unlawful\u2014can only be resolved on the merits in the context of a seriously contested factual account and a debate of public interest. The ruling sidesteps the constitutional debate on censorship but reaches the same conclusion through the proportionality test: in Belgium, a preliminary gag order in a public debate is virtually out of the question. Moreover, with the anti-SLAPP law of May 30, 2026, it has become even riskier to seek such an injunction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n ICT Rechtswijzer is the knowledge platform of the Intellectual Property, IT Law, AI Law, Data Protection, and Media Law department at Everest Advocaten, led by Joris Deene, Esq. Our attorneys assist companies seeking to defend themselves against defamatory statements and individuals who have been sued for their participation in public debate, from assessing the statements to mounting a defense under anti-SLAPP legislation.<\/p>\n\n\n\nThe ruling<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Legal analysis and interpretation<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Why the court remains silent on censorship, and whether that is justified<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Why a politician who voices criticism receives the same protection as a journalist<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
How the anti-SLAPP law changes this case<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Specifically, what does this mean?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Frequently asked questions (FAQ)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Can a judge impose a gag order before the case is decided on its merits?<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Someone is spreading false information about my company. Can I make them stop?<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Is it acceptable for a politician to publicly criticize a private company?<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
What is a SLAPP, and does the anti-SLAPP law apply to my current case?<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Conclusion<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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