Can a politician refer to an organization as \u2018far-right\u2019 and \u2018close to the Rassemblement National\u2019 during a televised debate, or does doing so constitute a tort that gives rise to a claim for damages? On May 18, 2026, the Court of First Instance of Hainaut, Charleroi Division, ruled that this is permissible, as long as it constitutes a value judgment with a sufficient factual basis and is made in the context of a debate of public interest. The non-profit organization Institut Thomas More, which felt targeted by Paul Magnette\u2019s statements, was unsuccessful: its claim was dismissed as unfounded.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On April 10, 2025, Paul Magnette appeared as a guest on the program \u201cBonsoir le Club\u201d on LN24. Speaking as the leader of an opposition party and a former mayor, he participated in a debate on the guide to relational, emotional, and sexual education (EVRAS) in French-language schools.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
During that conversation, he referred to the non-profit organization Institut Thomas More as an institute \u201crecognized as far-right\u201d and \u201ca French far-right institute with close ties to the RN.\u201d He linked that characterization to what he called the majority party MR\u2019s shift \u201ctoward the far right\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The nonprofit organization felt discredited by this. It filed a claim pursuant to Article 6.5 of the Civil Code<\/a> (CC) for a symbolic moral damages of one euro. According to her, Magnette attributed false facts to her and damaged her reputation. She also accused him of implying that she was involved in the deliberate school fires of 2023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The court declared the claim admissible but dismissed it on its merits. It assessed the alleged error in light of Articles 6.5 and 6.6 of the Civil Code, as interpreted by the right to free speech<\/a> of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights<\/a> (ECHR).<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to the court, an opposition politician who expresses himself in a militant manner enjoys the broadest possible freedom of speech, especially when his words are part of a debate of public interest, such as the one concerning the EVRAS guide. The court then drew the classic distinction between a factual assertion and a value judgment. According to the court, the characterization \u201cfar-right, close to the RN\u201d constitutes a value judgment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What is important is what the court did not do next: it did not examine whether that characterization was correct. It merely examined whether Magnette had a sufficient factual basis to form that opinion. According to the court, that basis existed, taking into account, among other things, the description of the institute in public sources, its founding by Charles Millon, the involvement of figures such as Charles Beigbeder, the funding through Pierre-\u00c9douard St\u00e9rin\u2019s Projet P\u00e9ricl\u00e8s, and the fact that the deputy director general was a candidate on the Listes Destexhe. The fact that the nonprofit organization disputed whether each individual source was strictly accurate was, according to the court, irrelevant: it sufficed that there were a sufficient number of consistent points of reference.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Regarding the issue of the school fires, the court ruled that it is factually incorrect to claim that Magnette had held the nonprofit organization responsible for them. A reasonable audience could not have understood his words that way. The nonprofit organization therefore did not allege any wrongdoing. Its claim was dismissed as unfounded, and it was ordered to pay the court costs. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The crux of this ruling is the distinction between a fact and an opinion. A factual statement can be deemed true or false\u2014and thus proven. A value judgment cannot: by definition, it is an assessment, and it is impossible to require someone to prove the \u201ctruth\u201d of an opinion. That distinction stems from the Lingens<\/a>-a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights, which has been repeated in full ever since.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What makes this decision significant is the shift it entails. The court does not assess whether the Institut Thomas More is truly far-right. It explicitly leaves that question open. It merely examines whether Magnette had sufficient factual grounds to form and express that belief. The question of truth thus recedes into the background, and the burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff: whoever challenges a value judgment must not prove that it is incorrect, but that there was no factual basis for it whatsoever. Only when an opinion lacks any factual basis does it become excessive and lose the protection afforded by Article 10 of the ECHR. In this case, that threshold is far removed from the specific facts of the case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The second point is methodological. The claim was based on the new standard of fault under Book 6 of the Civil Code, which has been in effect since January 1, 2025. Article 6.6, \u00a7 2 of the Civil Code asks whether the person concerned behaved as a prudent and reasonable person \u201cin the same circumstances\u201d would have. Those circumstances are decisive here: this involves an opposition politician speaking in a current social debate. It is precisely for this reason that Article 10 of the ECHR shapes the standard of care.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The codification does not change the approach compared to the old law. Under Article 1382 of the old Civil Code as well, a reputation claim was assessed using a standard of care, weighed against the freedom of expression. Book 6 sets this out in an explicit statutory checklist, but the balancing test in accordance with fundamental rights remains the same. A second layer stems from the finding that the nonprofit organization presents itself as an organization that seeks to actively influence public debate. Anyone who actively participates in that debate must tolerate sharper criticism. This is consistent with the Court\u2019s case law, which sets broader limits for acceptable criticism for those who seek out the debate (Otegi Mondragon<\/a>) and grants the broadest protection to the political opposition (Castells<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n For politicians and opinion leaders.<\/strong> It\u2019s worth keeping in mind where the line is drawn. A strong value judgment about an organization or individual is well protected, provided there is a factual basis for it. So build a case based on concrete evidence before making a sweeping statement. The risk lies not in the opinion itself, but in additional factual claims that can indeed be tested for accuracy. The school fires case illustrates this: if a reasonable audience could have understood the words as a concrete accusation, the assessment would have been different.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For organizations that participate in the public debate.<\/strong> Anyone who wants to actively influence public discourse must accept a higher level of criticism. A lawsuit based solely on a value judgment is legally difficult, because the judge does not examine whether the characterization is correct, but only whether there was a factual basis for it. If you want to protect your reputation, focus your efforts on demonstrably false factual claims, not on the assessment itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Is it permissible to publicly label a person or an organization as \u201cfar-right\u201d?<\/strong> What is the difference between a factual statement and a value judgment?<\/strong> Can an association receive compensation for reputational damage caused by a political statement?<\/strong> This ruling confirms that a politician in Belgium may publicly label an organization as \u2018far-right,\u2019 as long as that characterization is a value judgment with a sufficient factual basis and is made within the context of a debate of public interest. The judge does not assess whether the label is accurate, but whether there were reasonable grounds for it. For those engaged in public debate, this shifts the focus to the distinction between opinion and fact.<\/p>\n\n\n\nThe decision<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Legal analysis and interpretation<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
An opinion doesn't have to be true; it must have a factual basis.<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
The standard of error under Book 6 as a due diligence test consistent with fundamental rights<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Specifically, what does this mean?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Frequently asked questions (FAQ)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
In principle, yes. Such a characterization is a value judgment that is broadly protected by freedom of speech, as long as there is a sufficient factual basis for it and the statement is part of a debate of public interest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A factual statement asserts something that may be true or false and is therefore provable. A value judgment is a personal assessment whose correctness cannot be proven. In the case of a value judgment, the judge merely assesses whether there were sufficient factual grounds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
That is possible, but the bar is set high when it comes to value judgments in a political debate. The association must prove that a mistake was made, and that is particularly difficult as long as the speaker had a reasonable factual basis for their statement.<\/p>\n\n\n\nConclusion<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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