CEPT Recommendation (23)03<\/a>. Based on this context, the BIPT concludes that the decision targets calls made from abroad, not calls made from Belgium.<\/p>\n\n\n\nOn that basis, the BIPT has decided that transit calls may be treated as domestic calls during transit, provided that two conditions are met. First, during transit, the calls must be handled entirely via circuits specifically designated for domestic traffic, separate from international traffic, as required by Article 2 of the Royal Decree. Second, they must remain under the full control of the operator where the call was initiated. By \u201cfull control,\u201d the BIPT means technical control over all relevant network elements, end-to-end, up to the interface of the receiving operator in Belgium, so that the calling line identification cannot be altered.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
If these conditions are not met and the origin of the call cannot therefore be guaranteed, the call must be treated as an incoming international call, and all rules of the Royal Decree apply. Regardless of any contractual agreements between operators, the receiving operator in Belgium remains solely responsible for compliance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Legal analysis and interpretation<\/h3>\n\n\n\nThe BIPT fills a gap in the decree by interpreting the legislature's intent<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
The BIPT\u2019s most notable choice is methodological. The Royal Decree contains no definition of the terms \u201cinternational call\u201d and \u201cnational call\u201d\u2014precisely the terms around which the entire regulation revolves. Instead of a grammatical or textual interpretation, the BIPT has resolutely opted for a teleological approach: the purpose of the decree, as evident from the report to the King and the underlying CEPT recommendation, is decisive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
That choice is justifiable and even inevitable when the text contains a gap. Nevertheless, it deserves attention. The report to the King is not legislation in the strict sense, and a CEPT recommendation is, by its very nature, non-binding. The BIPT therefore bases its interpretation on instruments that themselves lack normative force, in order to exclude a category of calls (transit calls) from the scope of application that the literal text of Article 1 could indeed cover. This is pragmatic and consistent with the regulator\u2019s apparent intent, but it illustrates how heavily legal certainty in this area relies on soft law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The concept of full control as a linchpin<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
The distinction between a permitted transit call and an international call that must be blocked hinges on the concept of full control. The BIPT defines this as end-to-end technical control that prevents the calling line identification (CLI) from being altered en route. This is a functional criterion: it is not the legal structure or contractual relationships that matter, but the actual, technical impossibility of manipulating the CLI.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Legally, this criterion places a significant burden of proof on the operator. Anyone wishing to invoke the \u201cnational call in transit\u201d classification will have to demonstrate that they actually maintain end-to-end control. If they cannot substantiate this, the call falls back under the full blocking regime for incoming international traffic. This is consistent with two other provisions set forth in the Royal Decree: pursuant to Article 4, \u00a7 2, the receiving operator must disclose the identity of the user behind a specific call within 24 hours, and Article 5 allows the BIPT to revoke or suspend the right to an exemption in cases of abuse or fraud. The operator may therefore invoke the exception, but bears the burden of proof; anyone who fails to demonstrate compliance with the conditions falls back under the strict default regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Contractual Agreements Without Discharging Effect<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
A third point deserves emphasis because of its practical implications. The BIPT explicitly states that contractual agreements between operators do not shift the responsibility of the receiving operator in Belgium. Operators may contractually determine how they mutually ensure compliance, but the receiving operator remains solely liable to the BIPT. This is a classic concept in regulatory law, where public law obligations cannot be contractually waived; however, its explicit confirmation is no minor detail for the sector: it determines who bears the risk when a link in the chain fails.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Specifically, what does this mean?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
For receiving operators in Belgium.<\/strong> The obligation to block applies to you as soon as you are the first to receive an international call via a SIP\/SBC server located on Belgian territory. Contractual risk sharing with foreign or transit operators remains useful, but does not constitute a defense against the BIPT. Therefore, include robust guarantees and liability clauses in your interconnection agreements, and ensure that you can conclusively trace the origin of all traffic when the BIPT requests a user\u2019s identity within 24 hours.<\/p>\n\n\n\nFor operators who route domestic traffic through other countries.<\/strong> If you want your transit calls to be treated as domestic traffic, you must keep domestic and international traffic strictly separate and maintain verifiable end-to-end technical control. Proactively document that separation and that control. The burden of proof lies with you, and a failure to comply will not result in a fine per se, but will lead to your traffic being reclassified as international, resulting in a block.<\/p>\n\n\n\nFor companies that use legitimate foreign call centers or cloud services.<\/strong> Customer service and telemarketing calls made from abroad using Belgian geographic numbers are only covered by the exception in Article 4 of the Royal Decree if the numbers are fully controlled by a company established in Belgium and the agreement with the Belgian operator includes a complete list of those numbers. Check whether your current setup for outbound calls meets these conditions, because a non-compliant setup means that your calls will be blocked and your customers will no longer recognize you.<\/p>\n\n\n\nFrequently asked questions (FAQ)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
What exactly is CLI spoofing?<\/strong>
CLI spoofing is the manipulation of the caller ID on an incoming call so that the recipient sees a number other than the actual one. Scammers use it to impersonate a bank, government agency, or other trusted contact, usually as a stepping stone to phishing or financial fraud.<\/p>\n\n\n\nCan a company based abroad still call Belgian customers using a Belgian phone number?<\/strong>
This is permitted only under the exceptions set forth in the Royal Decree, such as for customer service or direct marketing, where the Belgian numbers are fully controlled by a company based in Belgium and have been provided to the operator in advance on a list. Outside of these conditions, the operator must block the call or suppress the caller ID.<\/p>\n\n\n\nWho is liable if a spoofed call gets through anyway?<\/strong>
With respect to the BIPT, the receiving operator in Belgium remains responsible for compliance with the Royal Decree, regardless of any agreements it has made with other operators. Mutual contracts cannot transfer this responsibility under public law.<\/p>\n\n\n\nConclusion<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
De mededeling van het BIPT verankert de blokkeringsplicht ondubbelzinnig bij de ontvangende operator in Belgi\u00eb en biedt een beperkte, technisch omkaderde uitweg voor legitiem nationaal verkeer dat via het buitenland wordt gerouteerd. Wie zich op die uitweg wil beroepen, draagt de bewijslast van een end-to-end controle over de nummerweergave, en kan zich niet achter contractuele afspraken verschuilen. Of deze toelichting alle vragen uit de sector wegneemt, valt af te wachten; het begrip volledige controle zal in de praktijk ongetwijfeld nieuwe discussies oproepen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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