Can a non-pseudonymized judgment be used as evidence in another court case?

The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) protects your personal data, but this protection is not absolute. As a rule, a party may use a previous judgment or ruling in which your name appears without pseudonymization as evidence in new legal proceedings. In the seclusion of a courtroom, the right to defend oneself and provide evidence often outweighs the protection of the personal data of the party concerned.

In a ruling of 17 November 2025, the Brussels Court of Appeal clarified a debate in which two lower courts had reached different conclusions.

The facts: data protection as a weapon against evidence?

This case centered on a conflict between the Fund for Innovation and Entrepreneurship (FIO) and a business manager, Mr. B.

The background was as follows:

• The FIO reclaimed coronavirus support from a company owned by Mr. B due to irregularities.
• The FIO wanted to submit an earlier judgment (dated December 28, 2022) as evidence. In that earlier judgment, a judge had ruled that Mr. B had falsified invoices in order to obtain subsidies.
• Mr. B opposed this by asking a prohibitory injunction. He argued that the use of this judgment without making his name unreadable (‘masking’) was a violation of the GDPR.

In the first instance, Mr. B was upheld by the Dutch-speaking court of first instance in Brussels, which ruled in a judgment of October 31, 2023, that there had been a violation of data protection law. The FIO appealed against this ruling.

The legal context: a fragmented landscape

Prior to this ruling, there was uncertainty. Various courts had different views on the matter:

• The strict view (Brussels, first instance): In this case, the court ruled that merely outlining a “context” or a “fixed practice” was insufficient to process personal data. If the judgment was not strictly necessary for the core of the claim, data protection law took precedence.
• The pragmatic vision (Antwerp, first instance): In a related case, the court in Antwerp ruled more leniently (March 7, 2024, no. 23/4593/A). As long as the judgment serves to frame a dispute between parties and safeguard the rights of defense, its use is justified.

The Brussels Court of Appeal had to decide on this matter.

The decision: evidence is a legitimate interest

On November 17, 2025, the court of appeal overturned the initial ruling and ruled entirely in favor of the FIO.

The decision is based on the following pillars:

• Legitimate interest (Art. 6.1.f GDPR): As the presumed victim of fraud, the FIO has the right to use all means necessary to support its claim. Proving facts in a court case is a legitimate purpose that justifies the processing of personal data.
• Relevance over minimization: The court ruled that pseudonymization would render the evidence useless. After all, the FIO had to prove that this specific person (Mr. B) was involved in previous forgeries. A pseudonymized judgment loses its persuasive power.
• Private context: The impact on data protection law is limited because the judgment is only used within the “sheltered context” of legal proceedings. The parties involved (judge, attorneys, opposing party) already know Mr. B's identity.

Legal analysis and interpretation

This ruling confirms an important balance in Belgian procedural law: the GDPR must not become a tool for blocking the discovery of the truth in court.

The role of the prohibitory injunction judge

The court confirms that a prohibitory injunction judge (based on Art. 209 Personal Data Processing Act) is authorized to intervene, even if it concerns evidence in other proceedings. However, the prohibitory injunction judge must be very cautious. The judge hearing the main case (the trial judge) is generally better placed to rule on the admissibility of evidence. Only in cases of clear violation where less drastic alternatives are possible may the injunction judge intervene in the presentation of evidence.

The European benchmark: Norra Stockholm Bygg

In the Norra Stockholm Bygg ruling (Case C-268/21 of 2 March 2023), the Court of Justice confirmed that the GDPR applies to the disclosure of documents in civil proceedings.

However, the Court clearly stated that national procedural rules requiring parties to provide evidence constitute a valid legal basis (Art. 6(3) and (4) GDPR). The crucial condition is proportionality: the national court must balance the interests of the data subject against the need for evidence.

The Brussels Court of Appeal applies this proportionality test. The court ruled that anonymization (or pseudonymization) was not possible in this case without rendering the evidence useless. After all, the FIO had to prove that this specific person (Mr. B) had committed the acts. A pseudonymized judgment would lose its evidential value. Moreover, the identity would still be immediately clear to the judge and the opposing parties due to the context of the case.

Theruling is in line with the view that procedural autonomy and the right to a fair trial (Article 6 of the ECHR) carry considerable weight. A party should not be prevented from presenting its evidence by an overly strict interpretation of data protection law.

The boundary: external dissemination

Please note: this tolerance applies specifically within the legal proceedings. Simply forwarding a non-pseudonymized judgment to a complete third party (e.g., a business partner who is not a party to the conflict) may constitute a violation of the GDPR. The “protected context” of the courtroom is therefore the determining factor.

What this specifically means

This ruling has important consequences in practice:

• For companies and creditors: You can rest assured that you may use previous judgments or official documents in which your opponent is mentioned in their entirety as evidence. You do not need to worry about a GDPR claim as long as you only use the documents within the proceedings.
• For the defense: The mere fact that your name appears in a judgment is not sufficient to block its use. You will have to prove that the use is manifestly unreasonable or is solely intended to intimidate you (abuse of law).
• For attorneys: The assessment remains essential. Is the name of the opposing party relevant to the evidential value? If so, then the legitimate interest covers the processing. If not (for example, if you are only using a judgment to illustrate a legal principle), then pseudonymization is appropriate.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Can I demand that my opponent conceal my name in documents submitted to the court?
Generally not. If your identity is relevant to the evidence (for example, to prove that you committed certain acts), the opposing party has a “legitimate interest” in presenting your data to the court in a non-pseudonymized form.

Is the handing down of a judgment in a court case a form of dissemination?
No, legally speaking, not in the same sense as a publication in a newspaper or on a website. Legal proceedings take place in a relatively closed circle (judges, court clerks, lawyers, and parties). As a result, the impact on the protection of your personal data is much more limited than in the case of public dissemination.

What does the European Court of Justice say about this?
In the Norra Stockholm Bygg case, the European Court of Justice confirmed that data protection rules must not obstruct the course of justice. However, the court must always assess whether the use of the data is “necessary and proportionate”.

Conclusion

Data protection law exists to protect citizens, not to conceal the truth in court. This ruling by the Brussels Court of Appeal, supported by the case law of the Court of Justice, confirms that in Belgium, the right to evidence takes precedence when a non-pseudonymized judgment is necessary to prove your case. The use of personal data within the walls of the courthouse falls under the legitimate interest of the claimant.