{"id":101816,"date":"2025-12-22T22:23:52","date_gmt":"2025-12-22T21:23:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.ictrechtswijzer.be\/?p=101816"},"modified":"2026-03-26T17:49:16","modified_gmt":"2026-03-26T16:49:16","slug":"is-doxing-a-printing-press-crime","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/www.ictrechtswijzer.be\/en\/is-doxing-een-drukpersmisdrijf\/","title":{"rendered":"Is doxing a printing press crime?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Doxing\u2014the malicious online dissemination of personal data\u2014is a growing problem. For a long time, it was unclear whether this fell under the jurisdiction of the Court of Assizes (for printing press crime) or the Correctional Court (for stalking). In a ruling<\/a> of 4 June 2025, the Court of Cassation ruled that doxing is not a printing press crime. This means that perpetrators will have to answer to the correctional court more quickly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The facts and legal context<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The case that gave rise to this ruling revolves around a conflict between the founder of the satirical website \u2018Nord Presse\u2019 and a journalist from Sudpresse. Following an article, the defendant published a post on his platform in February 2016. This post contained a photo of the journalist, her name and the municipality where she lived - not her full address.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The message was accompanied by a comment in which the article was labeled a \u201crag\u201d(torchon<\/em>) and wishing \u201cmuch courage\u201d to those around her. The result was a flood of hate messages and threats to the journalist, who subsequently filed a complaint for stalking.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The key legal question was the jurisdiction of the court. The defense argued that the publication constituted a printing press crime. According to Article 150 of the Constitution, printing press crimes must be tried by the Court of Assizes (a jury court), unless they are motivated by racism or xenophobia. Both the council chamber and the court of appeal in Li\u00e8ge followed this reasoning and declared the correctional court incompetent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The decision of the Court of Cassation.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In its ruling of 4 June 2025, the Court of Cassation overturns the earlier ruling of the Court of Appeal<\/sup>. The Court sets clear limits on what can be considered a printing press crime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Court reasoned that a printing press crime requires that there be a manifestation of opinion in writing. According to the Court, the mere publication of contact information, a photograph and a municipality for the purpose of disturbing the peace of a person (doxing) is not a manifestation of an opinion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Criticism of the journalistic value of the article does not constitute a printing press crime in this specific context either. The Court states:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\"L'op\u00e9ration consistant \u00e0 critiquer la valeur journalistique d'un article de presse de cette m\u00eame personne, dans le m\u00eame but, ne saurait davantage \u00eatre qualifi\u00e9 de d\u00e9lit de presse.\"<\/em> (The act of criticizing the journalistic value of a press article by the same person, for the same purpose, cannot be classified as a press crime either.) <\/sup><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The Court concludes that there is no abuse of the freedom of speech<\/a>, but rather an act aimed at disturbing the peace. As a result, the correctional court does indeed have jurisdiction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Legal analysis and interpretation<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

This ruling confirms a trend in case law to interpret the scope of the criminal press crime restrictively. The Court of Cassation applies a strict definition here: there must be criminal expression.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The analytical distinction made by the Court is interesting. The Court divides the internet post into different parts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n
  1. The data (photo, address):<\/strong> This does not in itself express an opinion and therefore cannot constitute a printing press crime.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  2. The text:<\/strong> Although words such as \u201crag\u201d (torchon<\/em>) clearly express negative sentiment and thus an opinion, the Court finds that, in the context of doxing, this does not exceed the limits of freedom of expression as a printing press crime, but rather serves as an instrument of harassment.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

    This approach is not free of criticism. The division comes across as artificial: the text and the photograph formed one whole and the accompanying text directed the readers. Moreover, a constitutional question arises that the ruling does not fully answer: when a publication simultaneously disseminates factual information and contains an opinion-forming element, does it still fall under the protection of Section 150 of the Constitution? By ruling that the purpose (disturbing the peace) prevails over the means (text with opinion), the Court applies a purpose criterion that limits the constitutional basis for press freedom in a way that is not evidently acceptable to everyone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    By ruling that the text is not a criminal opinion within the meaning of art. 150 Constitution - and therefore not a printing press crime - the Court of Cassation also seems to be implicitly ruling on the punishability on the merits, something that is normally up to the judge of facts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Nevertheless, the policy impact is clear: it avoids the need to systematically refer online harassment and doxing to the cumbersome and expensive Assize Court, which in practice often leads to impunity (after all, correctionalization of press offenses is constitutionally possible only for racially or xenophobically inspired offenses). By qualifying doxing as a common stalking crime and not a printing press crime, the path to correctional court remains open.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    What this specifically means<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

    This ruling has significant consequences for various parties involved in the digital landscape:<\/p>\n\n\n\n